With all the serious threats to freedom in the U.S. today, why is the ACLU spending valuable resources attacking the right of Vermonters to protect the political voices of non-wealthy citizens?
Related to the story above, the Supreme Court appears ready to deny Vermonters' the right to ensure wealth does not dominate elections. We argued on Vermont's behalf and are busy preparing for the next battle. Our allies at the National Voting Rights Institute have published all briefs filed in the case.
These are just two of the many recent additions to our authoritative resource library on Wal-Mart, including the latest news on Wal-Mart's front group and threats against homeowners who don't want to sell their land.
Seizures of personal property via eminent domain has become another tool of corporate abuse.
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Direct democracy, classically termed pure democracy,[1] comprises a form of democracytheory of civics wherein sovereignty is lodged in the assembly of all citizens. Depending on the particular system, this assembly might pass executive motions (decrees), make law, elect and dismiss officials and conduct trials. Where the assembly elected officials, these were executive agents or direct representatives (bound to the will of the people). In a representative republic sovereignty is held by a subset of the people, elected periodically, but otherwise free to advance their own agendas. and
This article deals with direct democracy in its modern sense. Modern direct democracy is characterized by three pillars:
The second pillar can include the ability to hold a binding referendum on whether a given law should be scrapped. This effectively grants the populace a veto on government legislation. The third pillar gives the people the right to recall elected officials by petition and referendum.
Other institutions exist which are regarded as being directly democratic in character. In particular, the use of sortition to fill posts in government or decision making bodies and the formation of Citizen Assemblies for collective decision making (Canada used this to come up with a proposal for a new constitution).
Switzerland provides the strongest example of modern direct democracy, as it exhibits the first two pillars at both the local and federal levels. In the past 120 years more than 240 initiatives have been put to referendum. The populace has been conservative, approving only about 10% of the initiatives put before them; in addition, they have often opted for a version of the initiative rewritten by government. (See Direct democracy in Switzerland below.)
Another distinctive example comes from the United States, where, despite being a federal constitutional republic where no direct democracy exists at the federal level, over half the states (and many localities) provide for citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives (also called "ballot measures" or "ballot questions") and the vast majority of the states have either initiatives and/or referenda. (See Direct democracy in the United States below.)
Some of the issues surrounding the related notion of a direct democracy using the Internet and other communications technologies are dealt with in e-democracy/Internet democracy.
Direct democracy was first experimented with in the ancient Athenian democracy of ancient Greece (beginning circa 508 BC (Finley, 1973)), which was governed for two centuries by a general assembly of all male citizens, by randomly selected officials, and ten annually elected representatives charged to command the army of the city (strategos).
The restrictive conditions for citizenship in Athenian democracy (only male citizens could participate) and the small size (population about 300,000) of the Athenian city-state minimized the logistical difficulties inherent to this form of government.
Also relevant is the history of Roman democracy beginning circa 449 BC (Cary, 1967). The ancient Roman Republic's "citizen lawmaking"—citizen formulation and passage of law, as well as citizen veto of legislature-made law—began about 449 BC and lasted the approximately four hundred years to the death of Julius Caesar in 44 BC. Many historians mark the end of the Republic on the passage of a law named the Lex Titia, 27 November43 BC (Cary, 1967). The presence of citizen lawmaking in Rome's governance was a contributing factor in the rise of Rome, and its Greco-RomanPolybius (c.200-120) immortalized the Roman Republic's constitutional "citizen lawmaking" in Book VI of his The Histories. civilization. (Cary, 1967).
Since Athenian democracy, however, this form of government has rarely been used (some governments have implemented it in part but few as fully as in ancient Athens). Modern mass-suffrage democracies generally rely on representatives elected by citizens (that is, representative democracy).
Modern-era citizen lawmaking began in the towns of Switzerland in the 13th century. In 1847, the Swiss added the "statute referendum" to their national constitution. They soon discovered that merely having the power to veto Parliament's laws was not enough. In 1891, they added the "constitutional amendment initiative". The Swiss political battles since 1891 have given the world a valuable experience base with the national-level constitutional amendment initiative (Kobach, 1993).
Many political movements seek to restore some measure of direct democracy or a more deliberative democracy (based on consensus decision-making rather than simple majority rule). Such movements advocate more frequent public votes and referenda on issues, and less of the so-called "rule by politician". Collectively, these movements are referred to as advocating grassroots democracy or consensus democracy, to differentiate it from a simple direct democracy model. Another related movement is community politics which seeks to engage representatives with communities directly.
Even before the predominance of the Internet, electronic constituent assemblies (ECA) were designed and used effectively. The ECAs combined television, telephone, and computer technologies to put representatives together with their constituencies in real time. The ECAs did the difficult consensus work of agenda-setting, defining proposals, amending proposals, and then voting (Hollinshead, 1998). ECAs have not been widely used up to this time.
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Arguments in favor of direct democracy tend to focus on perceived flaws in the alternative, representative democracy:
Nonrepresentative. Individuals elected to office in a representative democracy tend not to be demographically representative of their constituency. They tend to be wealthier, more educated, more male, and closer to the majority race, ethnic group and religion than a random sample would produce. They also tend to be concentrated in certain professions, such as lawyers. Elections by district may reduce, but not eliminate, those tendencies, in a segregated society. Direct democracy would be inherently representative, assuming universal suffrage (where everyone can vote).
Conflict of interest. The interests of elected representatives do not necessarily correspond with those of their constituents. An example is that representatives often get to vote to determine their own salaries. It is in their interest that the salaries be high, while arguably it's in the electorate's interest that their salaries be "representative", that is, average for the district they represent. The typical results of representative democracy are that their salaries are much higher than this average, however.
Corruption. The concentration of power intrinsic to representative government is seen by some as tending to create corruption. In direct democracy, the possibility for corruption is reduced.
Political parties. The formation of political parties is considered by some to be a "necessary evil" of representative democracy, where combined resources are often needed to get candidates elected. However, such parties mean that individual representatives must compromise their own values and those of the electorate, in order to fall in line with the party platform. At times, only a minor compromise is needed. At other times such a large compromise is demanded that a representative will resign or switch parties. Meanwhile, in direct democracy, political parties have virtually no effect, as people do not need to conform with popular opinions.
Cost of elections. Many resources are spent on elections which could be applied elsewhere. Furthermore, the need to raise campaign contributions is felt to seriously damage the neutrality of representatives, who are beholden to major contributors, and reward them, at the very least, by granting access to government officials.
Patronage and nepotism. Elected individuals frequently appoint people to high positions based on their mutual loyalty, as opposed to their competence. For example, Michael D. Brown was appointed to head the US Federal Emergency Management Agency, despite a lack of experience. His subsequent poor performance following Hurricane Katrina may have greatly increased the number of deaths. In a direct democracy where everybody voted for agency heads, it wouldn't be likely for them to be elected solely based on their relationship with the voters.
Lack of transparency. Direct democracy, where people vote directly for issues concerning them, would result in greater political transparency than representative democracy.
Insufficient sample size. A representative democracy has too small of a sample to accurately mimic public opinion. It is often noted that prediction markets most of the time produce remarkably efficient predictions regarding the future. Many, maybe even most, individuals make bad predictions, but the resulting average prediction is often surprisingly good. If the same applies to making political decisions, then direct democracy may produce very efficient decisions.
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Scale. Direct democracy works extremely well on a small system. For example, the Athenian Democracy governed a city of, at its height, about 30,000 eligible voters (male adult citizens). The use of direct democracy on a larger scale has historically been more difficult, however.
Practicality and efficiency. Another objection to direct democracy is that of practicality and efficiency. Deciding all or most matters of public importance by direct referendum is slow and expensive (especially in a large community), and can result in public apathy and voter fatigue. Modern advocates of direct democracy often suggest e-democracy (sometimes including wikis, television and Internet forums) to address these problems.
Demagoguery. A fundamental objection to direct democracy is that the public generally gives only superficial attention to political issues and is thus susceptible to charismatic argument or demagoguery. The counter argument is that representative democracy causes voters not to pay attention, since each voter's opinion doesn't matter much.
Complexity. A further objection is that policy matters are often so complicated that not all voters understand them. The average voter may have little knowledge regarding the issues that should be decided. The arduous electoral process in representative democracies may mean that the elected leaders have above average ability and knowledge. Advocates of direct democracy argue, however, that laws need not be so complex and that having a permanent ruling class (especially when populated in large proportion by lawyers) leads to overly complex tax laws, etc.
Voter apathy. The average voter may not be interested in politics and therefore may not participate. However, this would not be a problem so long as voter apathy was evenly distributed among the population. That is, if only 10% voted, that would still work as long as those 10% were representative of the total population. This would still be far better than the current situation, where far fewer than 1% of the public serve as representatives.
In Switzerland, single majorities are sufficient at the town, city, and state (canton and half-canton) level, but at the national level, "double majorities" are required on constitutional matters. The intent of the double majorities is simply to ensure any citizen-made law's legitimacy (Kobach, 1993).
Double majorities are, first, the approval by a majority of those voting, and, second, a majority of states in which a majority of those voting approve the ballot measure. A citizen-proposed law cannot be passed in Switzerland at the national level if a majority of the people approve, but a majority of the states disapprove (Kobach, 1993). For referendums or proposition in general terms (like the principle of a general revision of the Constitution), the majority of those voting is enough (Swiss constitution, 2005).
In 1890, when the provisions for Swiss national citizen lawmaking were being debated by civil society and government, the Swiss copied the idea of double majorities from the United States Congress, in which House votes were to represent the people and Senate votes were to represent the states (Kobach, 1993). According to its supporters, this "legitimacy-rich" approach to national citizen lawmaking has been very successful. Kobach claims that Switzerland has had tandem successes both socially and economically which are matched by only a few other nations, and that the United States is not one of them. Kobach states at the end of his book, "Too often, observers deem Switzerland an oddity among political systems. It is more appropriate to regard it as a pioneer." Double majorities are also required to introduce constitutional amendments in Australia. Finally, the Swiss political system, including its direct democratic devices in a multi-level governance context, becomes increasingly interesting for scholars of EU integration (see Trechsel, 2005).
Direct democracy was very much opposed by the framers of the United States Constitution and some signers of the Declaration of Independence. They saw a danger in majorities forcing their will on minorities. As a result, they advocated a constitutional republic over a direct democracy. For example, James Madison, in Federalist No. 10 advocates a republic over direct democracy precisely to protect the individual from will of the majority. He says, "A pure democracy can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority, and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is, that democracies have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." [1] John Witherspoon, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, said "Pure democracy cannot subsist long nor be carried far into the departments of state — it is very subject to caprice and the madness of popular rage." Alexander Hamilton said, "That a pure democracy if it were practicable would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position is more false than this. The ancient democracies in which the people themselves deliberated never possessed one good feature of government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity."
Despite the framers' intentions in the beginning of the republic, ballot measures and their corresponding referenda have been widely used at the state and sub-state level. There is much state and federal case law, from the early 1900s to the 1990s, that protects the people's right to each of these direct democracy governance components (Magleby, 1984, and Zimmerman, 1999). The first United States Supreme Court ruling in favor of the citizen lawmaking was in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118—in 1912 (Zimmerman, December 1999). PresidentTeddy Roosevelt, in his "Charter of Democracy" speech to the 1912 Ohio constitutional convention, stated "I believe in the Initiative and Referendum, which should be used not to destroy representative government, but to correct it whenever it becomes misrepresentative."
In various states, referenda through which the people rule include:
Referrals by the legislature to the people of "proposed constitutional amendments" (constitutionally used in 49 states, excepting only Delaware — Initiative & Referendum Institute, 2004).
Referrals by the legislature to the people of "proposed statute laws" (constitutionally used in all 50 states — Initiative & Referendum Institute, 2004).
Constitutional amendment initiative is the most powerful citizen-initiated, direct democracy governance component. It is a constitutionally-defined petition process of "proposed constitutional law," which, if successful, results in its provisions being written directly into the state's constitution. Since constitutional law cannot be altered by state legislatures, this direct democracy component gives the people an automatic superiority, and their rightful sovereignty, over representative government (Magelby, 1984). It is utilized at the state level in eighteen states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota (Cronin, 1989). Among the eighteen states, there are three main types of the constitutional amendment initiative, with different degrees of involvement of the state legislature distinguishing between the types (Zimmerman, December 1999).
Statute law initiative is a constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, petition process of "proposed statute law," which, if successful, results in law being written directly into the state's statutes. The statute initiative is used at the state level in twenty-one states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming (Cronin, 1989). Note that, in Utah, there is no constitutional provision for citizen lawmaking. All of Utah's I&R law is in the state statutes (Zimmerman, December 1999). In most states, there is no special protection for citizen-made statutes; the legislature can begin to amend them immediately.
Statute law referendum is a constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, petition process of the "proposed veto of all or part of a legislature-made law," which, if successful, repeals the standing law. It is used at the state level in twenty-four states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming (Cronin, 1989).
The recall is a constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, petition process, which, if successful, removes an elected official from office by "recalling" the official's election. In most state and sub-state jurisdictions having this governance component, voting for the ballot that determines the recall includes voting for one of a slate of candidates to be the next office holder, if the recall is successful. It is utilized at the state level in eighteen states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004, Recall Of State Officials).
There are now a total of 34 U.S. states with constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, direct democracy governance components (Zimmerman, December 1999). In the United States, for the most part only one-time majorities are required (simple majority of those voting) to approve any of these components.
In addition, many localities around the U.S. also provide for some or all of these direct democracy governance components, and in specific classes of initiatives (like those for raising taxes), there is a supermajority voting threshold requirement. Even in states where direct democracy components are scant or nonexistent at the state level, there often exists local options for deciding specific issues, such as whether a county should be "wet" or "dry" in terms of whether alcohol sales are allowed.
In the U.S. region of New England, nearly all towns practice a very limited form of home rule, and decide local affairs through the direct democratic process of the town meeting.
In the late 19th century, the Populist Party of America was formed to promote the creation of direct democracy in America.The Socialist Party USA is still committed to the establishment of direct democracy.
In Canada, the use of citizens' assemblies (also known as an estates-general in the province of Quebec), involving citizen bodies chosen at random, is growing and avoids the disadvantages of older, more plebiscitary forms of direct democracy. The province of British Columbia recently set up a Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform in which members were chosen at random for each riding. The citizens' assembly recommended the province use Single Transferable Voting2005. Requiring 60% of the popular vote to pass, it only achieved 57.3%. (STV) to elect the provincial legislature, but it narrowly lost a referendum in
^ A. Democracy in World Book Encyclopedia, World Book Inc., 2006. B. Pure democracy entry in Merriam-Webster Dictionary. C. Pure democracy entry in American Heritage Dictionary"
Cary, M. (1967) A History Of Rome: Down To The Reign Of Constantine. St.Martin's Press, 2nd edition.
Cronin, Thomas E. (1989). Direct Democracy: The Politics Of Initiative, Referendum, And Recall. Harvard University Press. Despite the author's bias against direct democracy, the book is a good read for the issues, personalities, and organizations in the Progressive period of the Reform Era.
Finley, M.I. (1973). Democracy Ancient And Modern. Rutgers University Press.
Fotopoulos, Takis (2005). The Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive Democracy. Gordios, Athens. (English translation from the original Greek) [2]
Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1999). The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence And The Promise Of Direct Legislation. Princeton University Press.
Kobach, Kris W. (1993). The Referendum: Direct Democracy In Switzerland. Dartmouth Publishing Company. Kobach's title is somewhat misleading. In addition to Switzerland, he discusses direct democracy in many countries, as well as in California.
Magleby, David B. (1984). Direct Legislation: Voting On Ballot Propositions In The United States. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Polybius (c.150 BC). The Histories. Oxford University, The Great Histories Series, Ed., Hugh R. Trevor-Roper and E. Badian. Translated by Mortimer Chanbers. Washington Square Press, Inc (1966).
Trechsel, Alexander H. (2005). Towards a Federal Europe? Special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, 12(3).
Zimmerman, Joseph F. (March 1999). The New England Town Meeting: Democracy In Action. Praeger Publishers.
Zimmerman, Joseph F. (December 1999). The Initiative: Citizen Law-Making. Praeger Publishers.
Citizens' Initiative and Referendum — I & R proposals and campaign resources for direct democracy such as citizens' initiative, referendum, and recall in the United Kingdom.
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Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc.
Denmark is a representative democracy. This means that everyday political decisions are made by representatives elected by the citizens; not by the citizens themselves. This applies to local authorities and counties as well as at national level when citizens, at general elections, compose the Folketing, which shall consist of 179 Members.
But there is no rule without exceptions. For even though Denmark is a representative democracy, the Constitutional Act lays down that there are situations in which all citizens of the country may or shall be directly involved in a decision, and where the voters have the last word. What is more, politicians can, at national level as well as in the counties and local authorities, decide to hold consultative referenda. But in such cases, only the voters are consulted.
The Basis of Referenda
The present Constitutional Act of Denmark took effect on June 5th 1953. In accordance with this Act, there are five factors which shall or may cause a binding referendum to be held:
When a major part of the Members of the Folketing request that a Bill be submitted to a referendum (Section 42 in the Constitutional Act)
When ceding sovereignty (Section 20 in the Constitutional Act)
Certain international treaties (Subsection 6 of Section 42 in the Constitutional Act)
Constitutional amendments (Section 88 in the Constitutional Act)
When altering the voting age (Section 29 in the Constitutional Act)
Moreover, the Folketing may decide to hold a consultative referendum as mentioned. Both kinds of referenda are mentioned below.
Bills (Section 42 in the Constitutional Act)
When the Folketing has passed a Bill, one third of the Members of the Folketing (i.e. 60) may request that the Bill shall not take effect until it has been submitted to a referendum. For a Bill to become void, the Constitutional Act lays down that a majority of the voters go against it, and this majority shall make out at least 30 per cent of all persons entitled to vote.
The possibility of subjecting Bills to a referendum has only been made use of once i.e. in connection with the "land laws" in 1963. The Liberals and the Conservatives who had more than a third of the seats in the Folketing requested that four of the Bills be subjected to a referendum. As appears from the survey, it meant that the Bills became void.
In Subsection 6 of Section 42 in the Constitutional Act, a number of exceptions have, however, been enumerated. Thus there are several laws which cannot be subjected to a referendum. This applies e.g. to finance Bills, taxation Bills, naturalization Bills and expropriation Bills.
Ceding of sovereignty (Section 20 in the Constitutional Act)
Competences which in accordance with the Constitutional Act belong under the Danish authorities can by law be transferred to "international authorities" as stated in the Constitutional Act. The provision has mainly been used in connection with the EU.
However, the Constitutional Act makes heavy demands on a Bill which deals with the ceding of sovereignty. Either five sixths of the Members of the Folketing shall vote for it, or – if a majority – but less than five sixths of the Members – votes for it, the Act presupposes that the Bill shall not be rejected at a referendum. However, in the last instance, the Bill only becomes void if a majority of voters goes against it, and if this majority makes out at least 30 per cent of all persons entitled to vote.
The referendum on the European Union which was held on June 2nd 1992 was held in accordance with Section 20 in the Constitutional Act. The Bill which formally approved Denmark’s accession to the Union (ratification) was only passed by 130 votes in the Chamber. The number of votes required to carry the Bill was 150. The Bill was therefore subjected to a referendum and was rejected, cf. the survey.
Certain international treaties (Subsection 6 of Section 42 in the Constitutional Act)
Subsection 6 of Section 42 in the Constitutional Act lays down that Bills ratifying international treaties can be subjected to a referendum if the Folketing decides to try the ratification at a referendum by introducing a separate Bill.
This provision led to the referendum on May 18th 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement. For there was general agreement that a referendum should, at all events, be held on the Edinburgh Agreement. And with prospects of more than 150 of the Members of the Folketing voting for the Agreement, the possibility of holding a referendum would be excluded in accordance with Section 20 in the Constitutional Act. The Edinburgh Agreement being an international treaty, it was therefore decided to ensure a referendum by recurring to the provision which is to be found in Subsection 6 of Section 42 in the Constitutional Act.
Amendments to the Constitutional Act (Section 88 in the Constitutional Act)
It is not easy to amend the Constitutional Act of Denmark. Firstly, the Folketing shall pass the amendment suggested. Secondly, writs for an election shall be issued and then the Bill shall be passed by the new Folketing. Subsequently, the amendment shall be subjected to a referendum. And it is only passed if it obtains a majority making out 40 per cent of the persons entitled to vote.
Altering of the voting age (Section 29 in the Constitutional Act)
If the voting age shall be altered, the Folketing shall pass a Bill to this effect. Subsequently, the matter will be subjected to a referendum. If a majority making out 30 per cent of the persons entitled to vote goes against the Bill, it is rejected.
Consultative referenda
As consultative referenda are not mentioned in the Constitutional Act, the Folketing can, at all times, decide to hold consultative referenda. As is apparent from the name "consultative", the Folketing is not under any obligation as to the outcome of such a referendum. If the decision is to be binding, the provisions of the Constitutional Act shall be observed.
A consultative referendum has only been held once, i.e. in 1986 when a vote was taken on the EC package.
Date and year of the refendum
Subject of the referendum
Statutory autority of the referendum
Number of valid votes
Percentage of total number of persons entitled to vote
Outcome
Yes
No
Yes
No
May 28th 1953
Constitutional amendment: Bill on the Constitutional Act of Denmark of May 1953 (age of youngest voters 25)
The Constitutional Act of June 5th 1915 with amendments of September 10th 1920, Section 94
1,183,292
319,135
45.8
12.3
Constitutional amendment passed
May 28th 1953
Lowering of the voting age from 25 to 23 or 21 (age of youngest voteres 21)
Act no. 50 of March 25th 1953 on referendum to be held in 1953 on amendment to the Constitutional Act of Denmark
840,815
for 23
700,122
for 21
30.0
for 23
25.0
for 21
Electoral age lowered to 23
May 30th 1961
Bill on altering of the voting age to the Folketing from 23 to 21
Constitutional Act of 1953, Section 29, cf. Section 42
586,113
479,146
20.3
16.6
Electoral age lowered to 21
June 25th 1963
1. Bill on acquisition of agricultural holdings nature
Constitutional Act of 1953, Section 42
843,756
1,354,588
27.7
44.5
"Land laws" became void
2. Bill on State smallholders
848,494
1,347,942
27.9
44.3
3. Bill on the pre-emptibon of the local authorities
872,042
1,328,036
28.7
43.6
4. Bill on the conservation of nature
937,259
1,261,545
30.8
41.5
June 24th 1969
Bill on the altering of the voting age to the Folketing from 21 to 18
Constitutional Act of 1953, Section 29, cf. Seciton 42
448,724
1,646,688
13.6
49.8
Electoral age of 21 retained
September 21st 1971
Bill on the altering of the voting age to the Folketing from 21 to 20
Constitutional Act of 1953, Section 29, cf. Section 42
1,601,840
1,231,804
47.4
36.5
Electoral age lowered to 20
October 2nd 1972
Denmark's Accession to the European Economic Communities
Constitutional Act of 1953, Subsection 2 of Section 20
1,958,043
1,135,755
56.7
32.9
Denmark accedes to the European Economic Communities on January 1st 1973
September 19th 1978
Bill on the altering of the voting age to the Folketing from 20 to 18
Constitutional Act of 1953, Section 29, cf. Section 42
1,224,448
1,049,832
34.2
29.0
Electoral age lowered to 18
February 27th 1986
Denmark's accession to the EC package (European Single Act) (consultative referendum)
Act no. 24 of February 5th 1986
1,629,786
1,268,483
42.0
32.7
Denmark's accession to the EC package passed by the Folketing
June 2nd 1992
Denmark's accession to the Maastricht Treaty
Constitutional Act of 1953, Subsection 2 of Section 20
1,606,442
1,653,289
40.5
41.7
Denmark did not accede to the Treaty
May 18th 1993
Denmark's accession to the Maastricht Treaty supplemented by the Edinburgh Agreement
Constitutional Act of 1953, Subsection 6 of Section 42, cf. Section 19
1,930,391
1,471,914
48.6
37.0
Denmark acceded to the Treaty supplemented by the Edinburgh Agreement
May 28th 1998
Denmark's accession to the Amsterdam Treaty
Constitutional Act of 1953, Subsection 2 of Section 20
1,648,534
1,341,055
41,3
(55,1% of the valid votes)
33,6
(44,9% of the valid votes)
Denmark acceded to the Amsterdam Treaty
September 28th, 2000
Denmark and the single currency
Constitutional Act of 1953, Subsection 2 of Section 20, cf. Section 42